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Summary.	Violence	risk	assessment	tools	are	increasingly	used	within	criminal	justice	and	forensic	
psychiatry,	however	there	is	little	relevant,	reliable	and	unbiased	data	regarding	their	predictive	
accuracy.	We	argue	that	such	data	are	needed	to	(i)	prevent	excessive	reliance	on	risk	assessment	
scores,	(ii)	allow	matching	of	different	risk	assessment	tools	to	different	contexts	of	application,	(iii)	
protect	against	problematic	forms	of	discrimination	and	stigmatisation,	and	(iv)	ensure	that	
contentious	demographic	variables	are	not	prematurely	removed	from	risk	assessment	tools.			
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There	are	currently	more	than	200	structured	tools	available	for	assessing	risk	of	violence	in	forensic	
psychiatry	and	criminal	justice.[1]	These	are	widely	deployed	to	inform	initial	sentencing,	parole	
decisions,	and	decisions	regarding	post-release	monitoring	and	rehabilitation.	In	some	jurisdictions,	
including	Canada,	New	Zealand,	and	until	2012	the	United	Kingdom,	risk	assessment	tools	are	or	were	
also	used	to	justify	indeterminate	post-sentence	detention.	In	addition,	violence	risk	assessment	tools	
are	used	to	inform	decisions	regarding	detention,	discharge,	and	patient	management	in	forensic	and,	
increasingly,	general	psychiatry.		
	
This	article	highlights	some	potential	ethical	problems	posed	by	risk	assessment	tools	and	argues	that	
better	data	on	predictive	accuracy	are	needed	to	mitigate	these.	It	focuses	on	the	use	of	risk	assessment	
tools	in	forensic	psychiatric	and	criminal	justice	settings.		
	
Professional	obligations	and	competing	values	
In	the	psychiatric	literature,	criticism	of	risk	assessment	has	focused	on	the	possibility	that,	in	deploying	
risk	assessment	tools,	mental	health	professionals	may	fail	to	fulfil	their	professional	obligations	to	their	
patients.[2,3]	Health	professionals	are	expected	to	make	the	care	of	their	patients	their	first	concern,	to	
build	trust	and	to	respect	patient	preferences,	and	this	is	reflected	in	professional	guidelines.[4]	Some	
argue	that	the	use	of	risk	assessment	tools	is	unjustified	when	it	is	intended	to	realise	other	values,	such	
as	justice	or	public	protection,	and	does	not	benefit	the	assessed	individual.[5,6,7,8]	Buchanan	and	
Grounds	hold	that	“it	is	inappropriate	to	comment	on	a	defendant’s	risk	unless	psychiatric	intervention	
is	proposed	or	other	benefit	will	result”.[9]	Similarly,	Mullen	claims	that	“[r]isk	assessments	.	.		are	the	
proper	concern	of	health	professionals	to	the	extent	that	they	initiate	remedial	interventions	that	
directly	or	indirectly	benefit	the	person	assessed”.[10]		
	
The	use	of	risk	assessment	tools	is	perhaps	most	clearly	at	odds	with	the	interests	of	the	assessed	
individual	where	the	tool	is	used	to	inform	decisions	regarding	post-sentence	detention.	In	this	context,	
the	default	position	is	that	the	person	will	be	released;	however,	if	the	tool	indicates	a	high	risk	of	
violence,	detention	may	be	extended.	It	could	be	argued	that	deploying	the	tool	thus	runs	against	the	
individual’s	interest	in	being	released	as	soon	as	possible.		
	
In	other	cases,	however,	the	application	of	a	risk	assessment	tool	will	benefit	the	individual.	There	are	at	
least	 three	 ways	 in	 which	 it	 could	 confer	 such	 a	 benefit.	 First,	 the	 risk	 assessment	 may	 be	 used	 to	
identify	beneficial	treatments.	Second,	the	use	of	a	risk	assessment	tool	may	facilitate	an	earlier	release	
or	discharge.	Suppose	an	individual	is	being	considered	for	parole	or	discharge	from	a	secure	psychiatric	
institution,	but	this	is	likely	to	be	refused	on	the	basis	that	there	is	insufficient	evidence	for	a	low	risk	of	
violence.	 In	this	situation,	application	of	a	risk	assessment	tool	may	provide	the	evidence	necessary	to	
secure	an	end	 to	detention.	 Third,	 even	when	a	 risk	 assessment	 results	 in	 further	detention,	 it	might	
nevertheless	confer	a	benefit	because	extended	detention	is	itself	in	the	individual’s	best	interests.	For	
example,	it	may	prevent	re-offending	and	an	even	longer	period	of	detention	in	the	future.		
	
Moreover,	 even	 when	 mental	 health	 professionals	 administer	 risk	 assessments	 that	 are	 against	 the	
assessed	individual’s	best	interests,	it	is	not	clear	they	thereby	violate	a	professional	obligation,	for	the	
view	that	medical	professionals	ought	never	to	compromise	a	patient’s	best	interests	can	be	contested.	
In	the	setting	of	infectious	disease	control	it	would	be	widely	accepted	that	physicians	may	sometimes	
compromise	 a	 patient’s	 best	 interests	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 other	 values,	 such	 as	 the	 health	 of	 family	
members	and	the	wider	public.[11,12]	Similarly,	many	would	hold	that	an	obstetrician	may	sometimes	
act	 to	protect	 a	 future	 child,	 even	 if	 this	 comes	 at	 some	 cost	 to	 the	patient—that	 is,	 the	prospective	
mother.[13]	It	can	be	argued	that	a	parallel	point	holds	in	relation	to	forensic	psychiatry:	professionals	in	
this	field	may	sometimes	give	precedence	to	values	besides	the	welfare	of	their	own	patients.[14]	Those	
who	hold	 that	 risk	 assessment	 tools	 should	 be	used	only	when	 they	benefit	 the	 patient	may	 thus	 be	
overstating	the	ethical	difficulties	created	by	such	tools.		
	
Nevertheless,	 the	 presence	 of	 competing	 values	 in	 risk	 assessment	 does	 create	 a	 potential	 ethical	
problem:	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 some	 values	 will	 be	 unjustifiably	 sacrificed	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 others.	 For	
example,	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 the	 interests	 of	 individual	 patients	 or	 prisoners	 will	 be	 unjustifiably	
compromised	in	the	name	of	public	protection,	or	the	reverse.	We	will	argue	that	a	lack	of	high	quality	
data	on	predictive	accuracy	compounds	this	ethical	risk.	
	
Predictive	accuracy	
Existing	 data	 suggest	 that	 most	 risk	 assessment	 tools	 have	 poor	 to	 moderate	 accuracy	 in	 most	
applications.	Typically,	more	than	half	of	individuals	classified	by	tools	as	high	risk	are	false	positives—
they	will	not	go	on	to	offend.[15]	These	persons	may	be	detained	unnecessarily.	False	positives	may	be	
especially	common	in	minority	ethnic	groups.[16,17]		
	
Rates	 of	 false	 negatives	 are	 usually	 much	 lower.	 Nevertheless,	 in	 typical	 cases	 around	 9%	 of	 those	
classed	as	low	risk	will	go	on	to	offend.[18]	These	individuals	may	be	released	or	discharged	too	early,	
posing	excessive	 risk	 to	 the	public.	 Such	 failures	of	negative	prediction	are	 frequently	associated	with	
significant	controversy	and	outrage,	as	reactions	to	recent	high	profile	cases	demonstrate.[19]	
	
The	 prevalence	 of	 prediction	 errors	 does	 not	 entirely	 undermine	 the	 rationale	 for	 deploying	 risk	
assessment	 tools.	 To	 balance	 risk	 to	 the	 public	 against	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 assessed	 individual,	 some	
method	for	assessing	risk	is	required,	and	risk	assessment	tools,	even	if	limited	in	accuracy,	may	be	the	
best	option	available.	However,	to	mitigate	the	risk	of	inadequate	or	excessive	detention,	the	limitations	
of	 risk	 assessment	 tools	 need	 to	 be	 well	 understood	 and	 factored	 into	 clinical	 and	 criminal	 justice	
responses.		
	
Unfortunately,	published	validation	findings	 for	the	most	widely	used	tools,	which	allow	for	predictive	
accuracy	to	be	estimated	in	advance,	frequently	present	a	misleading	picture.[20]	First,	though	there	are	
exceptions,	most	tools	have	not	been	externally	validated	outside	of	their	derivation	sample.[21,22]	Of	
particular	concern,	few	validation	studies	have	been	conducted	in	women,	ethnic	minority	populations,	
and	individuals	motivated	by	religious	or	political	extremism.	[23,24,25]	Consequently,	it	is	unclear	how	
far	 reported	 accuracy	 findings	 can	 be	 extrapolated	 to	 new	 settings	 and	 populations.[26,27]	 Second,	
there	is	strong	evidence	that	conflicts	of	interest	are	often	not	disclosed	in	this	field,	and	some	evidence	
of	 publication	 and	 authorship	 bias.[28]	 (Authorship	 bias	 occurs	 when	 research	 on	 tools	 tends	 to	 be	
published	by	the	authors	of	those	tools,	who	typically	find	better	performance.)	Third,	published	studies	
frequently	present	only	a	small	number	of	performance	measures	that	do	not	provide	a	full	picture	of	
predictive	accuracy.	[29]	
	
Thus,	 not	 only	 is	 the	 predictive	 accuracy	 of	 risk	 assessment	 tools	 imperfect,	 it	 is	 also	 imperfectly	
presented	 in	 the	 literature.	The	 limited	and	skewed	evidence	base	creates	a	 risk	 that	decision	makers	
will	rely	more	heavily	on	risk	assessment	scores	than	their	accuracy	warrants.	To	mitigate	this	risk,	there	
is	a	need	for	better	quality	data	covering	more	subpopulations.	Validation	studies	should	include	more	
than	 just	one	or	 two	performance	 statistics,	 and	data	on	 the	numbers	of	 true	and	 false	positives	and	
negatives	should	be	clearly	presented.	Conflict	of	interests	need	to	be	disclosed,	and	reviews	by	authors	
with	financial	conflict	of	interests	should	be	treated	with	caution.		
	
In	 addition	 to	 risking	 over-reliance	 on	 risk	 assessment	 scores,	 deficiencies	 in	 the	 evidence	 base	 also	
generate	 at	 least	 three	more	 specific	 problems,	which	we	 explain	 below:	 they	 (i)	 thwart	 attempts	 to	
match	 risk	 assessment	 tools	 to	 different	 contexts	 of	 application,	 (ii)	 complicate	 efforts	 to	 determine	
whether	 risk	 assessment	 tools	 are	 unjustifiably	 discriminatory	 or	 stigmatising,	 and	 thereby	 (iii)	
contribute	 to	 a	 risk	 that	 contentious	 demographic	 variables	 will	 be	 prematurely	 eliminated	 from	
assessment	tools.			
	
The	right	tool	for	the	context	
Selecting	 the	 optimal	 risk	 assessment	 tool	 for	 a	 given	 application	 requires	 trade-offs	 to	 be	 made	
between	 false	 negatives	 and	 false	 positives;	 attempts	 to	 reduce	 the	 number	 of	 false	 positives	 will	
increase	 the	 number	 of	 false	 negatives.[30]	 Tools	 with	 a	 low	 rate	 of	 false	 negatives	 (due	 to	 high	
sensitivity)	will	be	most	effective	at	protecting	the	public,	and	may	garner	most	political	support,	while	
tools	with	a	low	rate	of	false	positives	(due	to	high	specificity)	will	best	protect	the	rights	and	interests	
of	prisoners	and	psychiatric	patients.		
	
The	optimal	balance	between	false	positives	and	false	negatives	 is	an	ethical	decision	and	will	depend	
on	the	social	and	political	context	 in	which	the	tool	 is	 to	be	used.[31]	For	example,	avoidance	of	 false	
positives	 may	 be	 more	 	 important	 in	 jurisdictions	 with	 less	 humane	 detention	 practices	 than	 in	
jurisdictions	 with	 more	 humane	 practices,	 since	 the	 less	 humane	 the	 conditions	 of	 detention,	 the	
greater	the	harm	false	positives	will	tend	to	impose	on	the	assessed	individual.[32]	
	
The	appropriate	balance	between	false	positives	and	false	negatives	will	also	depend	on	the	stage	in	the	
criminal	 justice	process	or	 patient	 pathway	 at	which	 the	 tool	will	 be	deployed.	 For	 instance,	 suppose	
that	a	risk	assessment	tool	is	used	to	inform	decisions	about	post-sentence	detention	in	a	setting	where
an	individual’s	initial	sentence	is	designed	to	be	proportionate	to	their	degree	of	responsibility	and	the	
seriousness	 of	 the	 crime.	 In	 this	 case,	 detaining	 the	 individual	 beyond	 the	 end	of	 the	 initial	 sentence	
involves	imposing	a	disproportionately	long	period	of	detention.	In	this	context,	special	care	should	be	
taken	to	avoid	false	positives,	and	there	may	be	grounds	to	prefer	a	tool	with	a	very	low	false	positive	
rate	to	one	that	is	overall	more	accurate.		
	
However,	the	situation	is	different	when	a	tool	is	used	to	inform	parole	decisions.	In	this	context,	false	
positives	may	lead	to	refusal	of	parole	and	an	unnecessarily	long	period	of	incarceration	from	the	point	
of	view	of	public	protection.	Yet	 if	we	assume	that	the	initial	sentences	are	themselves	proportionate,	
then	the	overall	period	of	detention	for	‘false	positive’	individuals	will	remain	within	the	limits	required	
by	proportionality.	In	this	context	it	may	be	more	important	to	avoid	false	negatives.	
	
Matching	 risk	 assessment	 tools	 to	 different	 contexts	 of	 application	 thus	 requires	 trade-offs	 between	
positive	and	negative	predictive	accuracy.	For	each	context,	we	must	first	decide	which	type	of	accuracy	
to	 prioritise	 to	 which	 degree,	 and	 then	 select	 a	 tool	 that	 reflects	 this	 priority.	 Unfortunately,	 in	 the	
absence	of	 reliable	data,	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	make	 the	 latter	decision	confidently.	There	 is	a	need	 for	
studies	using	representative	samples	for	relevant	subpopulations,	avoiding	highly	selected	samples,	and	
presenting	 performance	 measures	 that	 allow	 false	 negative	 and	 false	 positive	 rates	 to	 be	 reliably	
estimated	for	a	particular	application.		
	
Discrimination	and	stigmatisation	
Some	argue	that	singling	out	individuals	for	unfavourable	treatment	on	the	basis	of	their	demographic	
characteristics	amounts	to	unjustified	discrimination.	This	criticism	is	often	levelled	at	racial	profiling	by	
police	and	airport	 security.[33]	A	 similar	 concern	might	be	 raised	 regarding	 risk	assessment	 tools	 that	
take	into	account	an	individual’s	demographic	characteristics	such	as	ethnicity,	age,	immigration	status	
and	 gender.	 It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 risk	 assessment	 tools	 should	 employ	 only	 ‘individualised’	
information,	such	as	information	about	declared	plans	and	desires	based	on	face	to	face	interviews,[34,	
35]	 though,	 even	 then,	 judgments	 may	 be	 subject	 to	 implicit	 biases	 based	 on	 the	 demographic	
characteristics	of	the	individual	being	assessed.[36]	
	
However,	 the	 requirement	 to	 utilize	 only	 individualised	 information	 is	 overly	 restrictive.	 Some	would	
argue	 that	demographic	profiling	 is	discriminatory,	or	problematically	 so,	only	when	 the	demographic	
variables	 used	 are	 recognised	 social	 groups	 (such	 as	 ethnic	 or	 gender	 groups),[37]	 or	 certain	 kinds	of	
recognised	 social	 groups,	 for	 instance,	 those	 whose	 membership	 is	 unchosen,[38]	 or	 that	 have	
historically	 been	 subject	 to	 oppression.[39]	 Risk	 assessment	 tools	 could	 theoretically	 exclude	 such	
variables.		
	
In	reply,	it	might	be	argued	that	exclusion	of	such	variables	is	insufficient	to	avoid	moral	concerns.	First,	
even	 if	 the	 problematic	 demographic	 variables	 are	 formally	 excluded	 from	 the	 analysis,	 they	 may	
continue	 to	 exert	 an	 influence;	 there	 remains	 the	 potential	 for	 implicit	 bias	 in	 the	 application	 of	 risk	
assessment	 tools	 and	 interpretation	 of	 risk	 scores.[40,41,42]	 Second,	 even	 if	 the	 problematic	
demographic	variables	are	formally	excluded	from	the	analysis	and	there	is	no	implicit	bias	in	applying	
the	tools,	there	may	still	be	a	correlation	between	membership	of	certain	demographic	groups	and	risk	
score.	For	example,	members	of	a	particular	ethnic	group	may	be	more	 likely	 than	average	to	receive	
high	risk	scores.	Some	may	hold	that	such	a	correlation	is	itself	problematic,	especially	if	it	is	due	to	past	
wrongdoing	against	members	of	the	demographic	group	in	question	(e.g.,	members	of	the	ethnic	group	
are	 indeed	more	 likely	 to	 offend,	 but	 only	 because	 they	 are	 victims	 of	 unjust	 social	 exclusion),	 if	 the	
correlation	 does	 not	 reflect	 a	 true	 difference	 in	 risk	 (e.g.,	 false	 positives	 occur	more	 frequently	 than	
average	in	the	minority	ethnic	group),	or	if	the	correlation	is	likely	to	lead	to	stigmatisation	of	the	group	
deemed	to	be	higher	risk.			
	
However,	even	if	the	use	of	risk	assessment	tools	does	involve	a	problematic	form	of	discrimination	or	
stigmatisation,	it	could	nevertheless	be	justified	if	the	case	in	favour	of	using	the	information	is	powerful	
enough.	The	parallel	with	 racial	profiling	 in	airport	 screening	 is	 instructive	here.	Airport	 screening	 is	a	
limited	 resource	 and	 there	 are	 reasons	 to	 deploy	 it	 to	 detect	 the	 maximum	 number	 of	 would-be	
terrorists.	 If	 profiling	 enables	 a	 far	 greater	 number	 of	 terrorist	 attacks	 to	 be	 prevented	 with	 the	
resources	 available	 than	 any	 other	 policy,	 and	 if	 the	 cost	 to	 those	 profiled	 is	 low,	 then	 it	 is	 arguably	
justified	even	 if	 somewhat	problematic,	 for	example,	because	discriminatory	or	stigmatising.	Similarly,	
the	resources	available	for	the	prevention	of	violence	are	limited,	and	if	deploying	a	risk	assessment	tool	
prevents	far	more	violence	than	could	otherwise	be	prevented	with	the	resources	available,	it	might	be	
justified	even	if	it	does	raise	some	concerns	about	discrimination	and	stigmatisation.		
	
Nevertheless,	it	is	important	that	risk	assessment	tools	deploy	the	most	specific	predictive	information	
available.	Arguably,	what	is	most	objectionable	about	some	forms	of	racial	profiling	is	that	they	deploy	
racial	appearance	as	a	predictor	when	more	specific	predictors	of	security	threat	are	available	and,	were	
these	 predictors	 used,	 racial	 appearance	 would	 add	 no	 further	 predictive	 value.[43,44]	 In	 such	
circumstances,	use	of	racial	appearance	seems	unnecessary.		
	
Similarly,	 it	 may	 be	 problematic	 to	 use	 demographic	 predictors	 in	 risk	 assessment	 tools	 when	more	
specific	 predictors	 of	 future	 offending	 are	 available	 and	 these	 predictors	 would	 render	 the	 use	 of	
demographic	categories	redundant.			
	
Unfortunately,	 the	 lack	 of	 good	 evidence	 on	 accuracy	makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 ascertain	whether	 existing	
tools	 do	 use	 the	most	 specific	 predictors	 available.	 To	 determine	 this,	 we	would	 need	 to	 be	 able	 to	
compare	the	accuracy	of	more	specific	and	less	specific	tools	using	relevant,	reliable	and	unbiased	data	
on	 accuracy.	 Currently	 deployed	 tools	 frequently	 do	 use	 demographic	 factors	 such	 as	 age	 and	
immigration	 status	 as	 predictors,	 and	 although	 recent	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 including	 such	
demographic	factors	improves	predictive	accuracy,[45,46]	further	data	are	needed	to	confirm	this.	
	
In	 the	absence	of	 these	data,	 there	are	 two	 risks.	On	 the	one	hand,	mental	 health	professionals	may	
continue	 to	 employ	 coarse	 demographic	 variables	 that	 result	 in	 unnecessary	 discrimination	 or	
stigmatisation.	On	the	other,	given	growing	public	concern	regarding	 the	use	of	 such	variables,[47,48]	
professionals	 or	 policy	makers	may	prematurely	 remove	 them	 from	 risk	 assessment	 tools.[49]	 Before	
variables	 are	 removed	 because	 they	 are	 potentially	 contentious,	 high	 quality	 research	 that	 uses	
transparent	methods	and	presents	all	 relevant	outcomes	should	 investigate	whether	the	demographic	
factors	included	in	current	tools	add	incremental	validity	to	tool	performance.	
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